Haidt writes: "... I've painted a portrait of human nature that is somewhat cynical. I've argued that Glaucon was right that we care more about looking good than about truly being good. Intuitions come first, strategic reasoning second. We lie, cheat, and cut ethical corners quite often when we think we can get away with it, and then use our moral thinking to manage our reputations and justify ourselves to others. We believe our own post hoc reasoning so thoroughly that we end up self-righteously convinced of our own virtue" (Haidt 220). Is this portrait accurate?
In Book II of the Republic, after Socrates disposed of Thrasymachus' arguments that might makes right, Glaucon asks him: "Socrates, do you wish really to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is always better than to be unjust? [Socrates answered,] I should wish really to persuade you, ... if I could" (Vol. 7, 310). Notice again the theme of appearance versus reality. This is a common thread in the Republic.
Soon after this exchange, Glaucon recounted the story of the ring of Gyges to make his point about justice. Gyges was working as a shepherd for the ruler of Lydia. After an earthquake, and while shepherding his flock, he found a cave on a mountainside that had opened up during the earthquake. He went inside and found a tomb with a bronze horse containing a corpse of a creature larger than a man. The corpse wore a golden ring, which Gyges took. He soon figured out that when he turned the ring in, he had the power to become invisible. He then used this power to seduce the queen and murder the king. He then became the king of Lydia.
After recounting this story, Glaucon used the story to make his claim about the true nature of man and the role of justice in society. He argued that it is better to appear just than to be just. And that, given the opportunity to live without consequences, most human beings would seek out pleasure and live selfishly.
"Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men" (Vol. 7, 312).
An important part of Glaucon's argument is the distinction he makes among goods. First, there are things that are intrinsically valuable, like a painting or health; second, there are things that are valuable for what they can get you, like money; and third, there are things that are valuable both intrinsically and for what they can get you, art and health may also fall in this category. Plato argues that justice is both intrinsically good and that it can bring you a good reputation, which is also helpful for what it can get you. By using the Gyges story, though, Glaucon argues that justice is really only good for the reputation it can get you and is not something that is intrinsically good in and of itself. But, Glaucon argues, if you aren't buying that argument, at the very least if acting justly does not bring you a good reputation, and not acting justly does bring you a good reputation, then the reasonable thing to do is to act unjustly.
Machiavelli, in The Prince, likewise sets forth the notion that we are better off seeming to be good than being good.
"... it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have described, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite." (Vol. 23, p. 25).
As an aside, there has been a transition lately, where some perceive that many leaders are not even trying to appear to be "just." George Pyle, the Editorial Page Editor for the Salt Lake Tribune, recently wrote an editorial in which he argued that Republicans in the Utah Legislature and in the United States Senate are not even pretending to further democratic values. These politicians are acting not in a Machiavellian or Glauconian way, but rather, according to Pyle and other commentators, they are acting in an authoritarian or tyrannical way simply because they are the ones in power and they can do what they want. He is arguing that they are essentially taking the position of Thrasymachus (and later Hobbes), that justice is nothing more than the interest of the stronger. And this approach is often adopted, or at least tolerated, by those who value order and abhor the chaos of an ever changing society.
So Glaucon gives Socrates a difficult challenge. In Book IV, Socrates makes his first argument in response. He argues that justice is to the state as health is to the body. And since health is of both intrinsic value and is good for what it gets you, then justice is both intrinsically good and good for what it gets the state. In a sense, justice cleanses the state and keeps it healthy in a (sort of) spiritual way and this allows it to function as it should for the benefit of all. Socrates then asks a rhetorical question: "Still our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice has not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly and practice virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust and act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?" (Vol. 7, p. 355) And while there is rhetorical appeal to his argument, the real issue is whether this comports with what is real within a community and within a person. Does "just" or "virtuous" living truly bring about intrinsic benefits, which human nature strives for its own benefit?
Socrates also makes two arguments in Book IX, but I'll address those arguments in a different post as they are not within this reading.
I agree with Socrates that justice within society is an aspirational goal. Specific individuals and communities should aspire to just and virtuous living. But I also agree with Haidt that Glaucon likely got it right in accurately portraying human nature. Just as living a healthy lifestyle to provide health to the body is the best way to live, it does not motivate most people (by itself) to live a healthy lifestyle. And likewise, living a just and virtuous life for the spiritual benefits that it brings does not, for the most part, motivate humans to live a just and virtuous life. What motivates humans to live virtuously is the effect that such a life has on reputation and the consequences that may arise from selfish choices. We are (generally) more concerned about what people think of us than the reality of who we are. I think Glaucon is correct that if we could live without consequences, most of us would seek out the greatest amount of wealth and pleasure that we could seek out. This being said, I (and I'm sure many others) would like to think that I would live virtuously if I had the ring of Gyges. But our society is ordered in such a way that I doubt I'll ever have the opportunity to find out.
